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Logical Consequence and the Theory of
Games
Paul Harrenstein
∗
Utrecht University
Re´sume´ : Les notions logiques de conse´quence sont fre´quemment relie´es a`
des concepts de solution de la the´orie des jeux. Dans ce contexte domine
la correspondance entre une formule classiquement valide et l’existence d’une
strate´gie gagnante pour un joueur dans un jeu a` deux joueurs. Nous proposons
une extension conservative de la notion classique de conse´quence base´e sur une
ge´ne´ralisation du concept de solution de jeu d’e´quilibre de Nash.
Abstract: Logical notions of consequence have frequently been related to
game-theoretical solution concepts. The correspondence between a formula
being classically valid and the existence of a winning strategy for a player
in a related two-person game, has been most prominent in this context. We
propose a conservative extension of the classical notion of consequence that
is based on a generalization of the game-theoretical solution concept of Nash
equilibrium.
∗This research is partly but generously supported by the CABS (Collective Agent
Based Systems) project of Delft University of Technology.
Philosophia Scientiæ, 8 (2), 2004, 179–193.
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Introduction
In their Theory of Games and Economic Behavior von Neumann and
Morgenstern argued that situations of conflicting interests present a
problem that had been “nowhere dealt with in classical mathematics”
[Neumann & Morgenstern 1944, p. 11]. They maintained that, due to
its interactive nature, a conflict situation could not be analyzed as a tra-
ditional optimization or decision problem. Rather, it is a “peculiar and
disconcerting mixture of several maximum problems”(ibid., page 11). An
optimization or decision problem for an individual can be represented
formally as a function f(xˆ0, . . . , xˆn). The individual’s predicament is
then to choose values for the variables x0, . . . , xn so as to maximize the
value of f(xˆ0, . . . , xˆn). The variables on which the function depends are
regarded as decision variables that are in the control of the individual.
Pursuing this conceptualization, a situation of conflict could in similar
terms be understood as a collection of functions gi(xˆ0, . . . , xˆn), each one
of which one of the participants tries to maximize by choosing suitable
values for the variables in a way that furthers his idiosyncratic interests.
Moreover, the variables on which these functions depend may overlap
and the parties involved may have control over only some of the rele-
vant variables. This makes that the optimal choices for an individual’s
variables, from his perspective, may be dependent on the very choices
the other participants make in their effort to maximize their functions
from their respective points of view. Thus the issue may evoke a sense
of impending circularity.
Traditional notions of optimality were thought to be no longer ad-
equate for such problems and new mathematical notions – viz., game-
theoretical solution concepts – had to be developed to take over their
role (ibid., page 39). In non-cooperative settings Nash equilibrium is
archetypical in this respect. Informally, an assignment of values for the
joint set of variables (henceforth a strategy profile) is a Nash equilibrium,
if none of the individuals can improve on it by unilaterally choosing dif-
ferent values for the variables in his control.
Having distinguished optimization problems and game-theoretical
problems thus, the satisfiability problem for Classical Propositional Logic
(CPC) could be classified as an optimization problem with respect to
truth. A formula is thought of as a function in its propositional vari-
ables. The issue is then to choose values for the propositional variables
so as to satisfy the formula in question. Classical logical consequence can
be understood in similar deliberative terms: a formula ϕ follows from a
collection of premisses Γ if and only if, each choice for the truth values
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of the propositional variables (henceforth a valuation) that succeeds in
satisfying all formulas in Γ , is a choice that makes ϕ hold as well.
As in this formulation there is present a definite element of choice
with respect to the possible truth-assignments, we come to think of
propositional variables as binary decision variables that are in the con-
trol of a decision maker. The accompanying image of a logical possibility
is that of a situation which obtains as the result of the decisions of an
individual, rather than that of an unalterable state of affairs.1
In line with this, it also becomes natural to consider the case in
which control over the propositional variables is distributed over multiple
agents. Logical space then assumes a game-theoretical aspect, with the
valuations as strategy profiles.
In analogy with the relation between optimization and game-theoreti-
cal problems, these considerations give rise to the following issue, which
can be regarded as the game-theoretical counterpart of the classical prob-
lem of logical consequence. Which conclusions is one to draw from a
family of theories, given that, for each of these theories, there is a player
who controls a (disjoint) set of propositional variables and who seeks to
satisfy his theory as well as he can by choosing appropriate values for the
variables in his control? This is a logical question, at the basis of which
there is a game-theoretical problem. For its resolution we take recourse
to the game-theoretical notion of a maximum equilibrium, which we will
introduce as a generalization of Nash equilibrium.
We argue that any particular distribution of the propositional vari-
ables and any particular family of theories define a unique strategic game,
which we refer to as a distributed evaluation game. We propose to con-
sider as the consequences of a family of theories and a distribution of the
propositional variables, those formulas that are satisfied in the maximum
equilibria of the accompanying game. This defines a game-theoretical
concept of consequence.
Example 1. Consider a propositional language with only two vari-
ables, a and b. Suppose that one player, Row, has control over a and
wishes to satisfy the formula a∧¬b. Let there further be another player,
Column, who has control over b and aims at the satisfaction of the for-
mula ¬(a ∨ b). The situation is summarized in the matrix below, in
1This way of viewing propositional variables as controllable by individuals has
its precursors in the field of Artificial Intelligence. A good example is Boutilier’s
distinction between controllable and uncontrollable propositions in [Boutilier 1994].
The image also underlies recent studies in distributed constraint satisfaction problems
such as [Yokoo et al. 1998, Walshetal 2001].
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which Row chooses rows – i.e., setting a to false (∅) or to true ({a}) –
and Column choosing columns in a similar fashion:2
∅ {b}
1 0
∅
0 0
0 0
{a}
1 0
The figures in boldface indicate the Nash equilibria, which in this par-
ticular game coincide with the maximum equilibria. Since a satisfied by
both equilibria, viz., {a} and {a, b}, it is considered a game-theoretical
consequence of the theories {a ∧ ¬b} and {¬(a ∨ b)} given the distribu-
tion of a to Row and b to Column. However, b does not follow thus, as it
not satisfied by the valuation {a}, although the latter is an equilibrium.
A player in a distributed evaluation game is thought of as preferring
valuations that satisfy his theory to those that do not. We will argue,
however, that theories can be interpreted as defining more gradated pref-
erences over the valuations and that, by doing so, more justice is done to
the interactive nature of the issue at hand. Thus a more comprehensive
class of games is brought within the scope of propositional logic.
The two main ideas on which this paper pivots – distributing control
over the propositional variables and interpreting theories as preference
relations — may seem to indicate a rash departure from the traditional
canons of propositional logic. Yet, we find that the concept of game-
theoretical consequence can be regarded as a conservative extension of
the classical notion in the following sense. In the special case in which
the control over the propositional variables is concentrated in one player,
a formula ϕ is a game-theoretical consequence of a (singleton!) family
of theories {ΓA} whenever ϕ is a classical consequence of Γ .
1 Games and Maximum Equilibria
In this section we review some of the elementary concepts from game
theory. The notion of a maximum equilibrium is also introduced.
2Each cell of the matrix represents a strategy profile. The bottom-left entries
indicate the ordinal preferences of the player choosing rows, the upper-right entries
those of the player choosing columns.
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We define a strategic game as a tuple (N, {Si}i∈N , {ρi}i∈N ), where N
is a countable and possibly infinite set of players and, for each player i in
N , Si is the set of strategies available to i. Accordingly, the generalized
Cartesian product over S, i.e.,×i∈N Si, is the set of strategy profiles of
the game, which we also denote by S. For each i ∈ N , ρi is a reflexive
and transitive, but not necessarily connected relation on the strategy
profiles S; we also allow ρi to be the empty relation. Moreover, i is
used as the infix notion of ρi. Thus, S could considered to be an ‖N‖-
dimensional space with for each strategy profile s and each player i in N ,
the strategy si its i-th coordinate. We will adopt the notation (s−i, s
′
i)
for the point that is like s except for the i-th coordinate, which is iden-
tical with the i-th coordinate of s′. Intuitively, each (s−i, s
′
i) denotes a
strategy profile that player i can reach from s by unilaterally deviating
and playing s′i.
By a partial preorder we understand a reflexive and transitive rela-
tion. If a partial preorder is moreover connected, we refer to it as a total
preorder. The notion of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is usu-
ally defined on games in which the preferences of the players are total
preorders over the strategy profiles. Then, for s a strategy profile in a
game
(
N, {Si}i∈N , {ρi}i∈N
)
:
s is a Nash equilibrium iff for all i ∈ N, for all s′ ∈ S : (s−i, s
′
i) i s.
We say strategy profile s is a best response for a player i if (s−i, s
′
i) i s,
for all strategy profiles s′ in S. Obviously, the set of strategy profiles
that contain a best response for each player coincides with the set of
Nash equilibria.
Our investigations, however, concern games in which the players’
preference relations are also allowed to be partial preorders and even to
be empty. We are now confronted with at least two obvious conserva-
tive extensions of the notion of a Nash equilibrium. On total preorders
the notions of a maximal element (no other element is greater) and a
maximum element (greater than any other element) coincide, but on
partial preorders or the empty relation they may diverge. Accordingly,
one could define, for i a player and s a strategy profile in a game G:
s is a maximal response for i iff for all s′ ∈ S : s <i (s−i, s
′
i),
s is a maximum response for i iff for all s′ ∈ S : (s−i, s
′
i) i s.
Lacking connectivity, the set of maximal responses for a player i may
contain elements s, s′ that are incomparable for i (on the i-th coordi-
nate) but which are such that sj = s
′
j , for each j = i. This possibility
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is excluded for maximum response strategies. Accordingly, we define a
strategy profile s of a game G to be maximal equilibrium in G if for
all players s is a maximal response. Similarly, a strategy profile s is a
maximum equilibrium in G if s is a maximum response for all players.
Observe that a strategy profile being a maximum equilibrium implies it
being a maximal equilibrium, but not in general the other way round.
By refining the preference orders of the players — i.e., if the preference
relations become smaller – the number of maximal equilibria may in-
crease; this is impossible with maximum equilibria. Hence, the following
monotonicity property holds for maximum equilibria only.
Proposition 1. Let (N, {Si}i∈N , {ρi}i∈N ) and (N, {Si}i∈N , {ρ
′
i}i∈N )
be strategic games denoted by G and G′, respectively. Let, further, for
each player i ∈ N , ρ′i ⊆ ρi. Then the maximum equilibria of G
′ are
included in the maximum equilibria of G.
Proof. For the contrapositive, consider an arbitrary s ∈ S that is not a
maximum equilibrium in G. Then, for some player i and for some s′ ∈ S,(
(s−i, s
′
i), s
)
/∈ ρi. Since ρ
′
i ⊆ ρi,
(
(s−i, s
′
i), s
)
/∈ ρ′i. Hence, s is not a
maximum equilibrium in G′.
2 Logical Consequence
Game-theoretical consequence will be defined for propositional languages
and it will rely on an interpretation of formulas and theories as relations
over the valuations. Some remarks with respect to classical propositional
logic are in order.
A propositional logic is defined as a pair (L(A),⊢), where L(A) is a
propositional language over a set A of propositional variables and ⊢ a
binary relation between theories and formulas of L(A). We will assume
the formulas of a propositional language to be given by a minimal set that
contains a non-empty but countable number of propositional variables A
and that is closed under negation ¬ and conjunction ∧. The connectives
falsum ⊥, verum ⊤, disjunction ∨ and implication → are defined as
usual.
For classical propositional logic Γ ⊢ ϕ informally reads “if all formu-
las in Γ are satisfied, then so is ϕ.” This notion can be given a formal
semantics in terms of its valuations, i.e., (characteristic functions of)
subsets of its propositional variables. Classical Tarskian semantics pro-
vides us with an inductive way to associate each formula ϕ with a set
Logical Consequence and the Theory of Games 185
of valuations – i.e., its extension [[ϕ]] — that is in accordance with the
truth-functional readings of the connectives.3 We say a formula holds in
a valuation s, if s is an element of the extension of ϕ, i.e., if s ∈ [[ϕ]].
Assuming classical consequence being given independently of a specific
semantical or proof theoretical characterization, the following soundness
and completeness result is obtained:
Γ ⊢CPC ϕ iff
⋂
γ∈Γ
[[γ]] ⊆ [[ϕ]].
In the sequel we will write [[Γ ]] for
⋂
γ∈Γ [[γ]].
Alternatively, each formula can be interpreted as a binary relation
on the set of valuations and define a semantics for logical consequence
in terms of the maximum elements of these relations.4 Define for each
formula ϕ a relation ρ(ϕ) as follows, where s and s′ range over valuations:
ρ(ϕ) =df.
{ {
(s, s′) : s ∈ [[ϕ]] implies s′ ∈ [[ϕ]]
}
if [[ϕ]] = ∅,
∅ otherwise.
Let further ρ(Γ ) be defined as
⋂
γ∈Γ ρ(γ). Then, obviously, Γ ⊆ Γ
′
implies ρ(Γ ′) ⊆ ρ(Γ ), i.e., the larger the theory, the finer the relation
it defines on the valuations. It can easily be checked that both ρ(ϕ)
and ρ(Γ ) are either the empty relation or a partial preorder, i.e., a re-
flexive and transitive relation, over the valuations. We have the following
proposition and corollary.
Proposition 2. For Γ a theory of a propositional language L(A):
[[Γ ]] coincides with set of maximum elements of ρ(Γ ).
Proof. First assume [[Γ ]] to be empty. Assume further for a reductio
ad absurdum that s is a maximum element of ρ(Γ ) and consider an
arbitrary γ ∈ Γ . Then, (s′, s) ∈ ρ(γ), for all valuations s′. So, in
3The resulting semantics is, of course, as follows:
[[a]] =df.
{
s ∈ 2A : a ∈ s
}
for a ∈ A
[[¬ϕ]] =df. [[ϕ]]
[[ϕ ∧ ψ]] =df. [[ϕ]] ∩ [[ψ]].
Here [[ϕ]] denotes the complement of [[ϕ]] in 2A, i.e., 2A − [[ϕ]].
4A maximum or maximum element of a binary relation ρ on a set S, is an element
of S that is at least as great as any other in S with respect to ρ. The maximal elements
of ρ in S are those elements than which none is greater in S with respect to ρ.
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particular, (s, s) ∈ ρ(γ) and from the definition of ρ(γ) then follows
that [[γ]] = ∅. Hence, s∗ ∈ [[γ]], for some s∗. Then also (s∗, s) ∈ ρ(γ)
and consequently s ∈ [[γ]] as well. With γ having been chosen as an
arbitrary element of Γ , we have that s ∈ [[Γ ]], which is at variance with
the assumption that [[Γ ]] be empty.
So, for the remainder of the proof we will assume [[Γ ]] to be not
empty. Consider an arbitrary valuation s. First assume that s /∈ [[Γ ]].
Then s /∈ [[γ]], for some γ ∈ Γ . With [[Γ ]] not empty, we may assume
there is some s′ ∈ [[γ]]. Then, however, (s′, s) /∈ ρ(γ) and (s′, s) /∈ ρ(Γ ).
Hence, s is no maximum element of ρ(Γ ). Finally, assume s ∈ [[Γ ]]. Now
consider an arbitrary valuation s′ along with an arbitrary γ ∈ Γ . Then,
s ∈ [[γ]] and so (s′, s) ∈ ρ(γ). With γ having been chosen arbitrarily, also
(s′, s) ∈ ρ(Γ ) and, consequently, s is a maximum element of ρ(Γ ).
Corollary 3. For Γ be theory and ϕ a formula of L(A):
Γ ⊢CPC ϕ iff the maximum elements of ρ(Γ ) are included in [[ϕ]].
Proof. By Proposition 2 and the definition of classical consequence.
Tarskian semantics for classical propositional logic disregards much
of the ordinal structure a theory imposes on the valuations. This, of
course, can be no censure of Tarskian semantics as a semantics for clas-
sical propositional logic. Its very soundness and completeness would
belie such a claim. In the field of artificial intelligence and philosophi-
cal logic, however, semantical investigations into non-standard reasoning
mechanisms have frequently found researchers in need of a richer struc-
ture on logical space. Formal analyses of default reasoning (e.g., [Velt-
man 1996]) and studies in non-monotonic consequence relations (cf. e.g.,
[Shoham 1988], [Krausetal 1990] and [Makinson 1994]) come under this
heading. In this context, also qualitative decision theory (e.g., [Boutilier
1994]) and belief revision (e.g., [Gardenfors 1988]) should be mentioned.
In each of these cases the valuations that are, in a specified sense, op-
timal with respect to the additional structure play a crucial role in the
definition of the key semantical concepts.
Our proposal for a game-theoretical notion of consequence is in line
with these researches, be it that the structure imposed on logical space is
that of a strategic game and that the notion of optimality is understood
in terms of compliance with a game-theoretical solution concept.
In the formulation of the question as to the game-theoretical conse-
quences of a family of theories, the theories are thought of as inducing
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[[ϕ]]
[[χ]]
[[ψ]]
[[ϕ]] [[ψ]]
[[χ]]
Figure 1: The extensions of three formulas ϕ, ψ and χ in logical space are
depicted on the left. The relation ρ({ϕ,ψ, χ}) is indicated by the shades
of grey: the darker the area, the higher ranked are the valuations in it, on
the understanding that the valuations in [[ϕ]] − [[ψ]] and those in [[ψ]] − [[ϕ]]
are incomparable. On the right, each block indicates a set of valuations still
possible as outcomes given particular choices for the variables not controlled by
the player with ρ({ϕ,ψ, χ}) as preference relation. The dark areas represent
his maximum responses.
the players’ preferences over the valuations. We will be particularly in-
terested in the maximum elements of any such relation within certain
subsets of the valuations, viz., the maximum elements in those subsets
that contain the valuations that are still possible outcomes given a par-
ticular choice of strategy for all but one player. Whether a player is
able to achieve an outcome he prefers above all others, may well depend
on the decisions of his opponents. Moreover, the best an individual can
achieve relative to some set of fixed values for the other players’ vari-
ables may be inferior to what he can achieve relative to some other set of
values for those variables. Any such locally optimal, but globally lesser
optimal outcome constitutes a significant game-theoretical datum. In
view of Corollary 3, however, the extension of a theory merely contains
a player’s most preferred outcomes, independently of her powers or the
others players’ preferences. By contrast, the relation ρ(Γ ) enables one
to single out the maximum valuations within any subset of valuations,
even if it this set is disjoint from the extension [[Γ ]] of Γ . In particular,
it enables us to identify for each particular choice of strategy by the op-
ponents, which are a player’s maximum responses. Figure 1 illustrates
this point graphically.
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3 Game-Theoretical Consequence
The fundamental idea underlying the concept of game-theoretical con-
sequence, to be introduced presently, is that, given a distribution of
control over the propositional variables, each family of theories defines
a strategic game, with the valuations as strategy profiles. This game
is then amenable to game-theoretical analysis. To make this concept
formally precise, let pi be a partition of a set A of propositional vari-
ables and {Γi}i∈pi a family of theories of L(A). We define a distributed
evaluation game for the propositional language L(A) as a strategic game(
pi, {Si}i∈pi , {ρ(Γi)}i∈pi
)
, with for each i in pi, Si the set of i’s strategies
given by 2i, the powerset of the set of propositional variables in i. We
will denote this game by G({Γi}i∈pi).
We are now in a position to define formally the central notion of this
paper: our concept of game-theoretical consequence.
Definition 1. Let L(A) be a propositional language and pi a partition
of the set A of propositional variables. Let further {Γi}i∈pi be a family
of theories of L(A) indexed by pi. Then for each formula ϕ of L(A):
{Γi}i∈pi  ϕ iff ϕ holds in all maximum equilbria of G({Γi}i∈pi).
The concept of unilateral deviation by a player from a strategy profile,
on which the concept of maximum equilibrium relies, can be represented
in neat set-theoretical terms. For s, s′ and s′′ strategy profiles (i.e., val-
uations) of a distributed evaluation game G({Γi}i∈pi) and for i a player,
c.q., a block, in pi:
(s−i, s
′
i) = (s ∩ i ) ∪ (s
′ ∩ i).
We now have the following proposition, which establishes game-theo-
retical consequence as a conservative extension of the consequence rela-
tion of classical propositional logic. Intuitively, it says that the game-
theoretical problem of consequence reduces to that of classical conse-
quence if there is only one player who wields control over all propositional
variables.
Proposition 4. Let Γ be a theory and ϕ a formula in a propositional
language in the propositional variables A. Then:
{ΓA}  ϕ iff Γ ⊢CPC ϕ.
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Proof. Since in G({ΓA}) there is only one player, the set of maximum
responses of A is identical with the set of maximum equilibria. Hence,
in virtue of Proposition 2, it suffices to prove that the set of maximum
responses of A in G({ΓA}) coincides with the set of maximum elements
of ρ(ΓA). First observe that (s−A, s
′
A) = (s ∩A) ∪ (s
′ ∩A) = s′, for any
two valuations s and s′. Hence, for any valuation s:
s is a maximum element of ρ(ΓA)
iff for all s′: (s′, s) ∈ ρ(ΓA)
iff for all s′: ((s−A, s
′
A), s) ∈ ρ(ΓA)
iff s is a maximum response for A in G({ΓA}).
This concludes the proof.
The next proposition also connects game-theoretical consequence and
classical propositional logic. It guarantees the extrapolation of negative
facts about the former to the latter. E.g., as a consequence of Propo-
sition 5 we find that game-theoretical consequence is consistent, i.e., in
general, {Γi}i∈pi  ⊥, if Γi = ∅, for all i ∈ pi.
Proposition 5. Let pi a partition of A and {Γi}i∈pi a family of theories
in L(A). Then, for all formulas ϕ:
{Γi}i∈pi  ϕ implies
⋃
i∈pi
Γi ⊢CPC ϕ.
Proof. It suffices to show that
⋂
i∈pi [[Γi]] is contained in the set of maxi-
mum equilibria of G({Γ}i∈pi). If
⋂
i∈pi [[Γi]] is empty, the proof is trivial,
so assume
⋂
i∈pi [[Γi]] to be none empty. Consider an arbitrary valua-
tion s and assume s ∈
⋂
i∈pi [[Γi]]. Consider an arbitrary i ∈ pi and an
arbitrary γ ∈ Γi. Then, s ∈ [[γ]]. Hence, [[γ]] = ∅, and for all valua-
tions s′, (s′, s) ∈ ρ(γ). With γ and i having been chosen arbitrarily it
follows, subsequently, that s is a maximum response for i and that s is
a maximum equilibrium in G({Γ}i∈pi) as well.
Game-theoretical consequence is monotonic and finite (or compact).
The former is established by Proposition 6; the latter we state as a fact
without giving a detailed proof.5 The general idea is, however, that for
5In another paper [Harrenstein 2002] the author gives a detailed proof for a notion
very similar to that of game-theoretical consequence as it is presented here.
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each formula γ and each block i in a partition pi of propositional variables
there is another formula γi, such that in general:
{Γi}i∈pi  ϕ iff
⋃
i∈pi
{
γi : γ ∈ Γi
}
⊢CPC ϕ.
Game-theoretical consequence then inherits finiteness from CPC.
Proposition 6 (Monotony). Let pi be a partition of the set A of propo-
sitional variables in L(A) and let {Γi}i∈pi and {Γ
′
i}i∈pi be families of
theories such that Γi ⊆ Γ
′
i , for all i ∈ pi. Then for all formulas ϕ:
{Γi}i∈pi  ϕ implies
{
{Γ ′i}i∈pi  ϕ
}
.
Proof. Observe that ρ(Γ ′i ) ⊆ ρ(Γ
′
i ), for each i ∈ pi. Then the claim
follows from Proposition 1 and the definition of game-theoretical conse-
quence.
Fact 7 (Finiteness). Let pi a partition of the propositional variables
of L(A) and let {Γi}i∈pi be a family of theories and ϕ a formula of L(A).
Then {Γi}i∈pi  ϕ implies that, for each i ∈ pi, there is a finite Γ
′
i ⊆ Γi
such that {Γ ′i}i∈pi  ϕ.
Another important property of classical consequence is that of re-
flexivity, i.e., ϕ ⊢ ϕ, for all formulas ϕ. However, for game-theoretical
consequence it is not in general the case that {ψi}i∈pi  ϕ, even if ψi
is syntactically identical to ϕ, for each i ∈ pi. Consider the following
example.
Example 2. Consider again the game of Example 1, but now assume
that both players seek to satisfy {a ∧ b}. The corresponding game can
now be summarized in the following matrix:
∅ {b}
0 0
∅
0 0
0 1
{a}
0 1
The valuation ∅ is a maximum equilibrium in this game. However,
∅ /∈ [[a ∧ b]]. Accordingly,
{
{a ∧ b}{a} , {a ∧ b}{b}
}
 a ∧ b.
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4 Varying Partitions and Coalitions
A distinguishing feature of game-theoretical consequence is the distribu-
tion of control over the propositional variables. The families of theories
game-theoretical consequence concerns, may be indexed by different par-
titions of the propositional variables. A formal topic that suggests itself
is how the set of game-theoretical consequences of a family of theories
indexed by a partition relates to the set of game-theoretical consequences
of a family of theories indexed by another partition. In order to assay
this issue with some success, we need a firm grip on the ways theories
can systematically be combined into one theory and how a theory can
be distributed over various theories. We argue that social choice theory
furnishes us with some of the concepts needed.
In this context recall that the partitions over a set can be ordered
as a complete lattice with respect to their coarseness as follows. For pi
and pi′ partitions over some set define:
pi  pi′ iff for all x ∈ pi there is a y ∈ pi′ such that x ⊆ y.
Intuitively, pi  pi′ denotes that pi is at least as fine as pi′.
So, for any partitions pi and pi′ such that pi  pi′, any element j of pi′
is the union of elements of pi. As we identified partitions of propositional
variables and sets of players, each element of pi′ could be conceived of as
a coalition in which players in pi have joined forces. But, if coalitions are
to be regarded as fully fledged participants in strategic situations, they
should also be ascribed preferences over the possible outcomes. Thus,
the question remains what the collective preferences are like and how
they depend on the preferences of the members of the coalition.
One of the fundamental concepts in this context is that of the (strong)
Pareto property (cf., [Arrow 1963], [Kelly 1987]). The collective prefer-
ence relation satisfies this property if and only if the coalition as a whole
prefers x to y, if every member of the coalition does. An admittedly
rather blunt way of combining preferences that satisfies the Pareto prop-
erty is by taking the latter as both a sufficient and a necessary condition
for coalitional preference relations, i.e., by simply intersecting the coali-
tion members’ preference relations.6 This procedure results in at most
6Be it noted that the intersection of a set of relations is not in general a total
preorder, not even if all the relations in the set are preorders themselves. This
would disqualify intersection as defining a feasible social choice function as they are
commonly understood. In our analysis, however, we merely required the preference
orders to be reflexive and transitive and the intersection of any set of reflexive and
transitive relations is again a reflexive and transitive relation.
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a reduction of the number of the maximum equilibria of a distributed
evaluation game.
Proposition 8. Let pi and pi′ be partitions of some set A such that pi 
pi′. Let G and G′ be the games (pi, {Si}i∈pi , {ρi}i∈pi) and
(
pi′, {Sj}j∈pi′ ,
{ρj}j∈pi′
)
, where for each k in either pi or pi′, Sk = 2
k. Let further
for each j ∈ pi′ the preference relation be defined as the intersection of
the preference relations of its constituent members, i.e., ρj =df.
⋂
i∈pi
i⊆j
ρi.
Then, the maximum equilibria in G′ are also maximum equilibria in G.
Proof. By contraposition. Assume for some strategy profile s that it
be no maximum equilibrium in G. Then there is some i ∈ pi and
some strategy profile s′ such that ((s−i, s
′
i), s) /∈ ρi. Consider this i
and s′. Then,
(
(s−i, s
′
i), s
)
/∈
⋂
i∈pi
i⊆j
ρi. Now consider the unique j ∈ pi
′
such that i ⊆ j. Observe that (s−i, s
′
i) =
(
s−j , (s−i, s
′
i)j
)
. Hence,((
s−j , (s−i, s
′
i)j
)
, s
)
/∈
⋂
i∈pi
i⊆j
ρi. That is
(
s−j , (s−i, s
′
i)j
)
j s. We may
conclude that s is not a maximum equilibrium in G′ either.
This proposition concerns games and their equilibria but it has a
logical counterpart in the following corollary.
Corollary 9. Let pi and pi′ be partitions of a set of propositional vari-
ables A such that pi  pi′. For {Γi}i∈pi a family of theories, define for
each j ∈ pi′, Γ ∗j =df.
⋃
i∈pi
i⊆j
Γi. Then, for all formulas ϕ:
{
Γi
}
i∈pi
 ϕ implies
{
Γ ∗j
}
j∈pi′
pi′ ϕ.
Proof. Observe that the relation associated with each Γ ∗j is identical to⋂
i∈pi
i⊆j
ρ(Γi) . The proposition then follows from Proposition 8.
The converses of neither Proposition 8 nor Corollary 9 hold in general.
Due to its greater strategic power, a coalition can reach a greater number
of strategy profiles by unilaterally deviating than any of its members can.
Among this greater number there may be strategy profiles that may
render deviation from a particular strategy profile s attractive, whereas
no such strategy profiles was accessible from s by any of the coalition’s
members alone. This phenomenon even occurs if all members of the
coalition have the same preferences over the outcomes.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a concept of logical consequence based on the
game-theoretical notion of maximum equilibrium. Classical consequence
was proved to be a special case of game-theoretical consequence. From
this perspective, it stands to reason to investigate game-theoretical con-
sequence using the standard logical techniques and concepts. The issue
of sound and complete formal and axiomatic systems for it is still very
much open in this respect.
Game-theoretical consequence, however, also raises some issues of its
own, for the proper treatment of which it would seem that concepts
from other sciences should be employed. We have already mentioned
social choice theory as a possible conceptual source to get a firm grasp
of how to combine and distribute theories, if the latter are looked upon
as representing preference orders.
In distributed evaluation games the players were identified with the
variables they control. The emphasis has so far been on the set max-
imum equilibria given different theories defining the preferences of the
players. We could also invert this image, and take the preferences of
players as fixed and investigate the sets of maximum equilibria by vary-
ing assignments of the variables to the players. Game theory may here
provide the apposite concepts.
Another issue is that of the existence of maximum equilibria in dis-
tributed evaluation games. This is the game-theoretical counterpart of
the issue of satisfiability in classical logic. Maximum equilibria in pure
strategies do not in general exist, and only pure strategies we considered.
Lattice theoretic restrictions may be imposed on the strategies and pref-
erences of players so that the existence of equilibria is guaranteed (cf.
[Topkis 1998], [Fudenberg & Tirole 1991]). An example is the lattice-
theoretical concept of (quasi-)supermodularity, which is closely related
to economic notion of complementarity. These reflections, however, raise
the question what these concepts correspond to on a logical level.
Game-theoretical consequence provides a generalization of classical
logic, in the study of which we argued concepts from game-theory, eco-
nomics and social choice theory become relevant and apposite.
